Technologies to reduce significantly fossil-fuel emissions currently are unavailable or only available at high cost. In light of this, the amount of research on the pace, direction, and benefits of environmentally friendly technological change has grown dramatically in recent years. This research includes empirical estimates of these effects and modeling exercises designed to simulate endogenous technological change in response to climate policy. Unfortunately, few attempts have been made to connect these two streams of research. This paper attempts to bridge that gap, reviewing both the empirical and modeling literature on technological change.
Introduction
The past decade has witnessed an explosion of research into the process of technological innovation. To a large degree, this research has proceeded in two distinct directions: exploring mechanisms to endogenize the process of productivity change in dynamic models used to evaluate public policy, particularly in the arena of climate change, and exploring various empirical, microeconomic questions surrounding the process of invention, innovation, and diffusion of individual technologies. There have been a number of studies reviewing these two trends separately (Gillingham et al. 2007; Löschel 2002; Popp 2005; Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 2003) . However, there has been little attempt to tie these two literatures together and, in particular, to suggest an agenda for future work. How can models used for policy evaluation better capture empirical phenomena, and how can empirical research better address the needs of models used for policy evaluation? The purpose of this paper is to examine these two questions.
In the area of climate change, it is hard to overstate the importance of estimating the expected path of technological change and the potential for public policies to influence that path. Kneese and Schultz (1978) argued that the potential to spur technological innovation may be the single most important criteria for environmental policy "over the long haul." Their applications were typical environmental problems where attention was focused on achieving rapid improvements in environmental quality immediately. Solutions were at hand and interest in technological change focused on incremental improvements to existing technologiesimprovements like higher efficiency, cleaner fuels and cheaper end-of-pipe treatment-that might arise but were not essential to achieving societal goals. The long haul attracted the attention of Kneese and Schultz but was not the focus of stakeholders and policymakers. In sharp contrast, climate change focuses squarely on the long haul. * Authors are Senior Fellow, Resources for the Future, and Associate Professor, Syracuse University, respectively.
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Addressing climate change means, for many people, stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases at a "safe" level. 1 There is no rapid improvement to be sought right now, and stabilization at almost any plausible level will require entirely different technologies for transportation and, likely, power generation. 2 This requires us to make predictions about new technologies-like Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) with capture and sequestration and hydrogen-and electric-fueled vehicles-rather than the kinds of incremental changes typically imagined, for example, with SO 2 scrubbers. 3 Indeed, recent studies of various stabilization scenarios for the United States focused much of their attention on technological development and assumptions (Clarke et al. 2006) This inherent link between technological development and successfully addressing climate change means that modeling technological change is no longer an academic exercise. Stern (2006) recently estimated that greenhouse gases could be stabilized at 550 ppmv CO 2 e, or about 450 ppmv CO 2 , for an estimated 1 percent of global world product. 4 He included a notional confidence interval of as much as a 4 percent loss but also a 2 percent gain. What strikes some economists as an optimistic central estimate, and a very optimistic upper-end of the range, derives in part from assumptions about technological change and the potential for public policy to affect it (Byatt et al. 2006 ). Yet, the absence of empirical work coupled to modeling applications makes it difficult convincingly to say much about those results. Meanwhile, the report continues to influence public opinion (Stern 2007) .
Three important concerns underlie the frustration and confusion surrounding the use of these and similar estimates in the area of public policy. One is whether the models cited in support of the estimates-models that include assumptions about technological developments responding to public policy-were intended to provide quantitative results or qualitative insights.
The former, normative modeling exercises are designed for cost-benefit analysis and are the 1 Economists advocating cost-benefit analysis (Nordhaus 1994; Pizer 2002; Tol 2006) would suggest pricing emissions to reflect marginal damages, which might or might not stabilize concentrations. 2 While often ignored, geo-engineering to address climate with, for example, the emission of reflective particles in the atmosphere, would allow us to continue to use conventional technologies and atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide to continue to rise. See IPCC (2007) . 3 In some ways, these are not entirely "new"─ IGCC plants exist, CO 2 has been captured and sequestered for enhanced oil recovery for some time, and electric cars exist. However, these technologies (or proposed alternatives) remain unproven at the necessary scale and uncompetitive with cheap, conventional alternatives. 4 
The R&D Process
New ideas are developed through research and development (R&D) projects. The process of R&D is costly, requiring the investment of capital by firms and government and the skills of highly trained research scientists. The economic influences on innovation can be divided into two broad categories. Economists refer to innovation responding to the needs of the marketplace as a demand-pull influence. In contrast, new research opportunities provided by scientific advances are referred to as a technology-push influence. 5 For example, advances in basic semiconductor materials were necessary to make solar energy feasible. Both of these affect the expected marginal rate of return (MRR) of innovation. Demand-pull influences raise the MRR by making the potential innovation more valuable. For example, innovation on pollution-control devices is only beneficial to a firm in the presence of environmental regulation, so that there will be a market for the device. Similarly, basic scientific advances increase potential returns by improving the likelihood that a research project will succeed. Finally, the innovative policy climate also is important. To earn profits from innovation, inventors must be able to appropriate the returns from their efforts. This can vary depending on factors such as the level of intellectual property rights and the type of innovation.
Key Features
When modeling innovation, the most important feature is that knowledge markets are imperfect. In most cases, new technologies must be made available to the public for the inventor to reap the rewards of invention. However, by making new inventions public, some, if not all, of the knowledge embodied in the invention becomes public knowledge. This public knowledge may lead to additional innovations or even to copies of the current innovation. 6 These knowledge spillovers provide benefit to the public as a whole but not to the innovator.
Economists studying the returns to research consistently find that knowledge spillovers result in a wedge between private and social rates of return to R&D. As a result, private firms do not have incentives to provide the socially optimal level of research activity. Examples of such studies include Mansfield (1977 Mansfield ( , 1996 , Pakes (1985) , Jaffe (1986 ), Hall (1996 , and Jones and Williams (1998) . Typical results include marginal social rates of return between 30 percent and 50 percent. In comparison, estimates of private marginal rates of return on investments in physical capital range from 7 percent to 15 percent (Bazelon and Smetters 1999; Jones and Williams 1998; Hall 1996) . Popp (2001 Popp ( , 2003 finds similar results specifically looking at environmental R&D. Since firms make investment decisions based on their private returns, the wedge between private and social rates of return suggests socially beneficial research 5 For examples, see Scherer (1965) , Schmookler (1966) , Rosenberg (1974 Rosenberg ( , 1982 , and Mowrey and Rosenberg (1979) . 6 Intellectual property rights, such as patents, are designed to protect inventors from such copies. However, their effectiveness varies depending on the ease in which inventors may "invent around" the patent by making minor modifications to an invention. See, for example, Levin et al. (1987). opportunities are being ignored by firms because they are unable to fully capture the rewards of such innovations.
These spillovers have two important implications for models of environmental policy.
First, it means that even if policies to correct the environmental externalities are in place, the level of environmental R&D still will be suboptimal. Because they ignore the positive spillovers created by R&D, firms will underinvest in research activity. This suggests two possible avenues through which policy can encourage the development of environmentally friendly technologies: correcting the environmental externality or correcting knowledge-market failures. Ideally, policies addressing knowledge-market failures address these issues for the economy as a whole, rather than just for environmental innovation. Examples of policies designed to encourage additional R&D include patent protection, broad government R&D subsidies, and generic R&D tax credits. Indeed, in studies on the potential effects of energy R&D for climate-change mitigation, Schneider and Goulder (1997) and Otto et al. (2006) show that policies to address knowledge spillovers are more effective if they address all knowledge spillovers, rather than focusing on R&D pertaining to alternative energy. Moreover, papers such as Popp (2006a) and Newell and Fischer (2005) find that using R&D subsidies alone, without environmental policies also in place, is not an effective climate-policy measure. While R&D subsidies encourage the creation of new technologies, they do not create incentives for the adoption of new technologies.
A second important consequence of knowledge spillovers is that they create potentially high opportunity costs for increasing environmental R&D. Evidence of high social returns to R&D is found not just in the environmental sector but throughout the entire economy. As such, any environmental R&D that comes at the expense of other R&D will have high opportunity costs. For example, consider an economy in which aggregate output, Y t , is devoted to consumption, C t , investment in physical capital, I t , or two types of research: environmental, R E,t , and other, R O,t , so that:
When environmental R&D increases by one dollar, one less dollar is available for the other activities. The opportunity cost of the first two simply is valued at one dollar. However, if the social rate of return is four times higher for R&D than for physical capital investments, giving up a dollar of other R&D activity has the same future effect as giving up four dollars of physical investment. This is important because empirical work suggests that at least some environmental R&D will displace other forms of R&D. Research activities are carried out by highly trained scientists and engineers. Since years of training are needed to enter the field, the supply of scientists and engineers available at any one time is inelastic-it cannot be increased quickly when new research needs arise. For example, Goolsbee (1998) finds that one of the chief beneficiaries of R&D tax subsidies are scientists and engineers, who receive larger wages when subsidies are increased. Similarly, Popp (2004a) presents evidence that approximately one-half of the energy R&D spending that took place in the 1970s and 1980s came at the expense of other R&D.
What We Know about the Response of R&D to Policy
There is a growing body of empirical literature that links environmental policy to innovation. Most of these studies have focused on estimating the direction or magnitude of the relationship between policy and innovation. Using international patent data, Lanjouw and Mody (1996) find a correlation across nations between patenting in environmental fields and pollutionabatement expenditures. Jaffe and Palmer (1997) look at the same relationship across U.S.
industries. Comparing pollution-abatement data and innovation data across these industries, they estimate a positive elasticity of pollution-control R&D with respect to pollution-control expenditures of 0.15. However, when estimating the same relationship using patents as the measure of innovation, they do not find evidence of a relationship between patenting and pollution-abatement expenditures. Finally, Brunneimer and Cohen (2003) find that patents increase by just 0.04 percent when pollution-abatement costs and expenditures increase by $1 million. While both of these papers find small effects, they also use aggregate measures of technological change. Each looks at innovation within specific industries. Jaffe and Palmer include all patents and all R&D associated with an industry, whether or not they are environmental technologies. Thus, their results show a small increase in overall inventive activity, but do not show if additional environmental R&D takes place at the expense of other R&D. Brunneimer and Cohen focus specifically on environmental technologies but group several such technologies together for each industry. Thus, the effects of innovation on specific technologies may be masked by stagnant trends in other technologies.
In each of these studies, pollution-abatement expenditures serve as a proxy for the stringency of environmental regulation. Other papers use energy prices and related regulations as the mechanism that induces innovation. Although the observed price changes might not be policy-related, the results also can be applied to situations where policy affects prices, such as a carbon tax. Newell et al. (1999) use an approach closely related to hedonic techniques to study the effect of both energy prices and energy-efficiency regulations on technological advances in energy efficiency for air conditioners and natural gas water heaters. They find that energy prices have the largest inducement effect, although they do not estimate a price elasticity. Popp (2002) uses patent data to study the relationship between energy prices and innovative activity. Using a distributed lag model, he estimates a long-run elasticity of energy R&D with respect to energy prices of 0.35. The median lag occurs in 4.9 years, suggesting that more than one-half of the full effect on R&D of an energy-price increase will have been experienced after just five years. Thus, prices (or other regulations that increase the cost of using fossil fuels) can be expected to stimulate new research quickly.
Modeling Approaches in Practice
That innovation responds to incentives suggests that modeling accurately induced technological change is important, as the path of climate-friendly technology will vary in scenarios with and without policy. As a result, models used to evaluate the cost and effects of climate-change mitigation policies increasingly have explored ways to endogenize the effect of R&D on technology and mitigation costs. They generally have included a variable representing R&D or "knowledge" that influenced economic behavior through one of three routes: a direct effect on the level of emissions intensity, a reduction in the mitigation cost function, or productivity gains in sectoral production functions (with sector-specific R&D stocks in multisectoral models). At the same time, these models have pursued a range of approaches to matching different pieces of empirical evidence described above.
For example, Nordhaus (2002) assumes that the rate of growth in emissions intensity is a function of the annual R&D directed at carbon saving:
where σ t is the industrial carbon energy/output ratio at year t (implying is the rate of change of the carbon energy-output ratio), R t is the R&D inputs into the carbon-energy sector in year t, and the Ψ i are parameters (calibrated assuming optimized R&D in the past).
Importantly, he (a) assumes that the cost of a dollar of R&D is four dollars of output-reflecting the opportunity cost of displaced R&D in other sectors-and (b) calibrates the model so that in the baseline without climate policy, the return to additional R&D also is four times higher than ordinary investment. Buonanno, Carraro, and Galeotti (2003) take a similar approach in that they focus on R&D affecting emissions intensity but instead use a stock of accumulated R&D (versus the flow above) to affect the level of emissions intensity (versus the rate of change above). Their R&D stock also influences overall productivity, building in significant spillovers among different types of R&D. Given these different approaches to modeling spillovers and opportunity The preceding approach can be viewed as an evolution toward knowledge as an ordinary factor of production versus an exceptional device for lowering costs. Goulder and Mathai (2000) are a parallel step on that journey. They assume that accumulated R&D-knowledgeinfluences mitigation costs. Their cost function, therefore, depends on both the abatement level and the stock of knowledge:
where A t is the abatement level, H t is the stock of knowledge, and C() is the abatement cost function. They make particular assumptions about functional form (C() is proportional to H -1 ) and knowledge accumulation (including adjustment costs). Finally, they calibrate the model so that when knowledge accumulation is allowed, it lowers costs by 30 percent (based on work by Manne and Richels [1992] ). Not surprisingly, they find that endogenizing technological change lowers costs by about 30 percent.
Finally, multi-sector general equilibrium models allow one to move away from mitigation cost functions and to think concretely about R&D influencing costs and productivity in particular sectors, such as "carbon free energy" or even a particular energy-generating technology. Goulder and Schneider (1999) do this in a seven-sector model where spillovers exist within, but not among, each sector. That is, each sector has a top-level constant elasticity of substitution production function of the form 7 Popp (2004a) presents upper and lower bounds of the influence of opportunity costs. The upper-bound estimates assume that R&D levels change as the opportunity costs change. The lower-bound estimates change the opportunity costs but constrain R&D to remain at the base-case levels. The later can be interpreted as the gains from removing the assumption of partial crowding-out. They are not the gains that would result if the government intervened to remedy the problem of partial crowding-out.
where Q is total output, H is appropriable sector-specific knowledge, G is an aggregate of other inputs, and H is non-appropriable sector-specific knowledge (α's and ρ are parameters). Both H and H accumulate research R t , with a parameter β governing how much spills over into the nonappropriable stock.
They have a specific R&D sector, which also creates the possibility of crowding out as marginal R&D costs increase with supply. Without spillovers, they find that endogenizing technological change creates the possibility of lowering the cost of achieving a given emissions target. With spillovers, this effect can be muted or reinforced depending on the pattern of spillovers across sectors. In particular, they find that asymmetries in spillovers matter more than other specification choices.
Summarizing Behavior
The R&D modeling discussion is organized around two overarching questions: the form of the model (whether it focuses on emissions intensity, abatement cost, or sectoral productivity) and the parameterization of R&D effects. That is, the assumptions about the return to R&D investments (e.g., spillovers) and the opportunity costs of the endogenous R&D (e.g., crowding out). Regardless of form, the parameterization determines how endogenizing technological change affects the results relative to an exogenous technology assumption.
The single most important feature in these models is how the model accounts for imperfections in knowledge markets that produce high social rates of return. Models that omit these imperfections fail to capture both above-market-rate returns to climate-related R&D and above-market-rate returns to other R&D that exist. In cases where they are calibrated to have such returns without these imperfections, allowing the models to then equilibrate R&D and market returns will either: 1) overestimate the level of innovative activity that will be induced by climate policy; or 2) implicitly assume that appropriate government policies to correct R&D market imperfections will accompany climate policy, so that social and private rates of return are equalized. Thus, while such results may not be incorrect, it is important to note that results from models that do not explicitly include R&D market imperfections would not be obtained without government support for R&D. Moreover, these models not only assume that government provides R&D support but that it provides this support in an optimal manner so the gap between private and public returns is closed.
To aid understanding of how spillovers are included in models, we can imagine two summary statistics that quantify the key assumptions. First, the magnitude of spillovers can be measured by a simulation showing how an incremental dollar of environmental R&D changes welfare, instituted by an exogenous, "manna-from-heaven" increase in the environmental R&D budget. Positive spillovers would suggest, for example, that an additional $1 million of R&D should improve welfare by more than $1 million. 8 Second, the model should be simulated with a climate policy in place and the environmental R&D budget both frozen at the reference-case level and determined endogenously. Here, it would useful to calculate the change in welfare divided by the change in environmental R&D expenditures. This would represent an estimate combining both positive spillover effects and the opportunity costs of R&D. A positive number would indicate that spillovers from environmental R&D exceed any opportunity costs; a negative number would indicate they do not. In simpler models, these measures would be synonymous with the parameter choice. In the multi-sector models, the latter question tends to be lurking in assumptions about the increasing cost of R&D and the pattern of R&D returns in various sectors.
This has the appearance of being more structural but begs the question of the degree of spillovers across sectors, something Goulder and Schneider (1999) 8 While the empirical literature predicts returns of roughly a 4:1 ratio, note that this will be slightly higher if the welfare calculation in the model includes avoided damages from clean technology. That is because studies finding a 4:1 ratio of social to private returns for R&D focus on returns measurable in markets. Any environmental benefits that occur will be in addition to this 4:1 ratio. 
Learning by Doing
The popular alternative (or compliment) to modeling technological change as a function of R&D is to model technological progress-particularly the lowering of costs of an existing technology-as a response to increased production, or learning by doing (LBD). As noted, the 9 Helpman (1998) provides an introduction to general-purpose technologies.
consequence of endogenous versus exogenous technological change through explicit, additional R&D expenditures depends on the relative importance of spillovers versus crowding out. The consequence of endogenous versus exogenous technological change through LBD is unambiguously positive: there is no opportunity cost other than the current cost of production.
This suggests that assumptions of one mechanism or another will have important implications for model results. Most importantly, the potential of crowding out of R&D implies a higher opportunity cost to technological change that progresses via R&D, rather than by LBD. In contrast, investing in new energy technology (as in the LBD framework) does not include this added social cost.
Key Features
Because the social costs of technological change are lower in the LBD framework, models relying on LBD tend to provide larger estimates of the potential gains from endogenous technological change. Thus, an important empirical question is the relevant importance of each type of learning. Unfortunately, few empirical studies address this question. Such research is limited both by data availability (as measures of costs, technology usage, and matching R&D data would be needed) and concerns over endogeneity of key variables. A typical learning curve model regresses costs as a function of cumulative capacity:
where Cost is the cost of investment of a new installation, and CumCap is the cumulative installed capacity of (or sometimes cumulative output produced by) the technology prior to
Recently, papers by Klaassen et al. (2003) , Söderholm and Sundqvist (2003) , and Söderholm and Klaassen (2007) have extended this basic model to estimate "two-factor" learning curves for environmental technologies. These two-factor curves model cost reductions as a function of both cumulative capacity (LBD) and R&D (learning by searching, or LBS). In these models, R&D typically is aggregated into a stock of R&D capital to be comparable with the notion of cumulative capacity. Thus, endogeneity is a concern, as we would expect both investments in capacity to be a function of past R&D expenditures and R&D expenditures to be influenced by capacity, which helps determine demand for R&D. Söderholm and Sundqvist (2003) address this endogeneity in their paper and find learning-by-doing rates around 5 percent and learning-by-searching rates around 15 percent, suggesting that R&D, rather than LBD, contributes more to cost reductions. 10 This work is preliminary and needs to be replicated with other data sets before it can be considered a definitive answer to the relative role of LBD versus LBS. However, it can be used to provide some guidelines for modeling technological change. First, it suggests that both mechanisms (LBD and LBS) are relevant. As of yet, however, no study has addressed potential interactions between LBD and LBS. For example, experience may reveal which attributes of a technology need attention and thus inform the direction of future R&D. Second, it suggests that the relative importance of each must be considered when calibrating models including both types of learning. The main lesson here is to avoid double counting. A learning-by-doing rate of just five percent is lower than typically reported in the LBD literature, where learning rates of 15 percent to 20 percent are common. A simple, one-factor LBD curve shows the relationship between capacity and costs but does not address causation. A two-factor curve begins to address this causation. As such, while the combined effect of LBD and LBS in a two-factor model may be comparable to learning rates from a one-factor model, the individual components should be smaller.
Modeling Approaches in Practice
Despite concerns about causality, the empirical tractability of learning curves has led to the wide use of learning-induced technological change throughout the literature, particularly in disaggregated, "bottom-up" models (including the NEMS model used by the Energy Information Administration; EIA 2003). Disaggregated models are well-suited for incorporating learning because of their rich technology specificity, which more easily lends itself to a learning curve for each technology. Some more aggregated models also use learning, but it is not as common. One reason is that learning tends to be thought of as a technology-specific phenomenon and is therefore harder to apply in the typical aggregation of a "top-down" model.
The most common way to capture learning-induced technological change in climate policy models is based on an exponential relation between unit cost and cumulative output, as in 10 To avoid problems with endogeneity, Nemet (2006) uses simulation techniques to decompose cost reductions for PV cells into seven categories. Plant size (e.g., returns to scale), efficiency improvements, and lower silicon costs explain the majority of cost reductions. Notably, most of the major improvements in efficiency come from universities, where traditional LBD through production experience would not be a factor. Learning from experience (e.g., through increased yield of PV cells) plays a much smaller role.
(4) above. This implies that a doubling of experience will reduce specific costs by a factor of 2 -α , also known as the progress rate. This formulation requires only the output and cost history to parameterize the learning function. Two-factor learning models, where both cumulative capacity and cumulative R&D enter the cost function, can be represented by appending (R&D) -β to (4).
A recent summary (Section 11.5, IPCC WGIII 2007) of four bottom-up energy models reported single-factor learning models with rates between 4 percent and 19 percent-and in the case of solar photovoltaics in the MESSAGE model, 28 percent. Among those models that can include two-factor learning models, the second factor tends to be additive; that is, the learningby-doing rate remains the same, while the effect of R&D is added. Doubling R&D is modeled to have between a 1 percent and 11 percent effect on costs.
Goulder and Mathai (2000) provide one example of an aggregate approach to modeling LBD. Rather than modeling cumulative knowledge to be a function of R&D investment, they assume it is a function of abatement. With this specification, current abatement acts as a learning investment in knowledge, analogous to R&D investment. The result is similar to many other learning-by-doing studies in that both the optimal carbon tax is lower at all points in time and that for any given carbon tax, there may be considerably more total abatement. And, as is the case with ordinary learning models, the effect of LBD on the slope of the optimal path of abatement is ambiguous, as learning both motivates earlier abatement to further lower future costs and later abatement to then take advantage of those lower costs.
Summary and Looking Forward
Much like the R&D discussion, an important agenda for the modeling community is clearer reporting of benchmark model results and responsiveness and comparison to historical, empirical data. Among the seven features noted earlier, the first three remain relevant: baseline productivity growth; elasticity of energy demand over the near-, medium-, and long-term; and, for policy simulations, a comparison of the range of simulated, relative prices compared to historic variation. In models that combine R&D and LBD, it is particularly important to conduct this type of benchmarking to ensure that the model is not double counting the potential gains from technological change and continues to replicate key benchmark features.
A key challenge for moving our understanding of LBD forward is disentangling the causal forces that lead to lower costs. While the statistical correlation between experience and lower costs is strong, understanding the causes of cost reductions is necessary to make informed policy decisions. Unfortunately, separately identifying the various learning mechanisms is difficult. Learning through experience is confounded with more conventional learning through R&D, where R&D may be poorly measured and typically related to output and capacity. An important area for further work is to try and disentangle these effects.
Government R&D
We have focused primarily on the incentives faced, and activities conducted, by private firms. However, governments also play an important role in energy R&D. First, note that government R&D can help to compensate for underinvestment by private firms. Unlike firms, the government is in a position to consider social returns when making investment decisions. In addition, government R&D tends to have different objectives than private R&D. Government support is particularly important for basic R&D, as long-term payoffs, greater uncertainty, and the lack of a finished product make it difficult for private firms to appropriate the returns of basic R&D.
This combination of public and private efforts complicates efforts to model R&D.
Focusing on private efforts suggests that a wedge should exist between social and private returns to R&D. Government R&D aims, at least in part, to close this gap. However, there is little empirical evidence specifically on the returns to government R&D. This is due, in part, to the nature of government projects, which are often more basic and long term in nature, making estimating returns difficult. Given this, estimating the gap between private and social rates of return that exist after accounting for both private and public energy R&D spending is an important question for future research. 12 If government R&D successfully narrows the gap between private and social rates of return, this effect should be acknowledged in baseline models. However, if that is the case, it is also important for models to acknowledge that such policy interventions will need to continue for the simulated results to hold. That is, if a baseline simulation implicitly includes existing government R&D efforts as part of its calibration, policy simulation must assume that this government R&D continues. Furthermore, any additional government R&D that occurs in a policy simulation properly should be credited as a marginal increase over baseline government R&D efforts.
In addition to correcting for underinvestment by private firms, many government R&D projects aim to improve commercialization of new technologies (or "transfer" from basic to applied research). Such projects typically combine basic and applied research and often are government/industry partnerships (National Science Board 2006). For example, the United States passed several policies in the 1980s specifically designed to improve transfer from the basic research done at government and university laboratories to the applied research done by industry to create marketable products. 13 As such, this technology transfer can be seen as a step between the processes of invention and innovation. Empirical work suggests that these policies have had the desired effect. For example, Dai, Popp, and Bretschneider (2005) find that the Bayh-Dole Act, which facilitated university patenting, led to more university patents but not more R&D, suggesting that universities responded to the Bayh-Dole Act by patenting results that previously would have gone unpatented. 14 Related to energy, Popp (2006b) finds that energy patents spawned by government R&D are cited more frequently than other energy patents. More importantly, after passage of these technology-transfer acts, the "children" of these patents (the privately held patents that cite government patents) are the most frequently cited patents, suggesting that transferring research results from the government to private industry produces valuable research results.
The role of government R&D for commercialization is not explicitly modeled in climatepolicy simulations, as most models do not include the necessary level of detail. However, they provide important lessons for interpretation. In particular, these results suggest that model results on the potential of technological change should be considered a best-case scenario. For such results to be realized in practice, policymakers need to be aware of the lessons from the 13 Examples include the Stevenson-Wylder Technology Innovation Act of 1980, the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, and the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986. 14 The hope of the Bayh-Dole Act was that these patents would increase licensing opportunities, so that private firms would help to market university inventions. See Sampat (2006) for further discussion.
microeconomic literature on technology transfer and ensure policies are in place to make optimal use of the results of both public and private R&D.
In the end, simulation models used for policy analysis rarely include government R&D, even though government R&D tends to be a frequent policy lever. But, as this section highlights, we have little empirical evidence that could be used to model the interaction of public R&D, private R&D, and eventual technological change. And, even if such historical evidence existed, it might be hard to extrapolate given the wide variety of government R&D activities, management structures, and likely effectiveness over time. Perhaps the best guidance for the moment is to recognize that current trends in technological change exist alongside substantial government expenditures that likely need to continue in order to maintain those baseline trends. Moving forward, it would be valuable if future empirical work identified the effect of significant changes in government R&D, distinct from private R&D and other relative price changes.
What about Technology Diffusion?
The process of technological change ends with diffusion. 
The Timing of Diffusion
The diffusion of a new technology is a gradual, dynamic process; new technologies are not adopted en masse. Rather, adoption usually begins with a few early adopters, followed by a period of more rapid adoption, with the rate of adoption leveling off once most potential users have adopted the technology. This process generates the well-known S-shaped diffusion curve:
the rate of adoption rises slowly at first, speeds up, and then levels off as market saturation approaches. The figure on page 30 illustrates such a curve, with market penetration plotted on the y-axis and the passage of time plotted on the x-axis. Early attempts to explain this process focused on the spread of information (e.g., epidemic models, such as Griliches [1957] ) and differences among firms (e.g., probit models, such as David [1969] ). More recently, researchers combined these explanations while adding potential strategic decisions of firms. These papers find that firm-specific differences explain most variation in adoption rates, suggesting that gradual diffusion is a rational process in response to varying incentives faced by individual actors.
Environmental technologies can be different, however. Incentives to adopt end-of-pipe technologies that serve only to reduce emissions must come from environmental regulation.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the few studies that address adoption of environmental technologies find that regulations dominate all other firm-specific factors. Gray and Shadbegian (1998) , Kemp (1998) , Kerr and Newell (2003) and Popp (2005) all show that environmental regulations increase the probability of adopting environmentally friendly technologies. While the response varies by firm characteristics, regulations are the most important explanatory variable.
In contrast, energy-efficiency and fuel-saving technologies may be adopted more slowly, as it is cost savings, rather than a direct regulatory requirement, that matter. This can be influenced by policies that raise prices. Rose and Joskow (1990) , for example, find that the adoption of fuel-saving technology by U.S. electric utilities is correlated positively with fuel prices. However, gradual diffusion is more likely and, even without climate policy, some adoption will occur, much like traditional technologies.
This suggests that modeling climate policy ideally would distinguish among different types of climate-mitigating technology, with particular emphasis on whether they might be subject to direct regulation. For example, mandating IGCC plants, hybrid cars, or even more efficient building shells would imply more rapid technology diffusion of the sort noted for endof-pipe technologies. Such policies might be motivated in part because of evidence of market failures in technology adoption beyond the pricing of greenhouse gas externalities. Jaffe and Stavins (1995) find that higher energy prices lead to greater use of insulation in new home construction but that the costs of installation are a more important consideration. This is part of a more general literature that finds inefficiencies in adoption of energy-saving technologies by consumers, with various explanations ranging from consumers using high discount rates, to credit-constrained consumers caring more about up-front costs than lifetime cost savings, to uncertainty over future costs (Jaffe et al., 2003 constrained to 1 percent of production in the year they are introduced and can expand by a factor of three in each decade thereafter (Manne and Richels 2002) . The NEMS model used by the U.S.
Energy Information Administration uses both adjustment costs to increase the short-run costs of rapidly increasing capacity and absolute constraints based work by Mansfield and Blackman (DiPardo 2000) . In contrast, the IGSM model introduces an additional, fixed factor that acts as an adjustment cost to mimic gradual penetration (McFarland et al. 2004) . While this does make penetration responsive to price incentives, it does not consider the potential increase in diffusion rates created by a mandate or targeted regulation.
Absent this interest in modeling the effect of mandates on diffusion, it is worth noting that in many cases, simplistic representations that basically ignore diffusion may be sufficient. It is not unusual to see market penetration of a product in 10 years or less. For example, Popp (2001) finds that new energy patents have their largest effect on energy consumption within four years. Combined with the results of Popp (2002) that find that the median lag of energypatenting activity with respect to prices is also about 4 years, this suggests that the main effect of price-induced technological change will occur within one decade. Thus, gradual diffusion will be less relevant in models where the time periods modeled are decades rather than individual years. Lanjouw and Mody (1996) find that the majority of vehicle air-emissions patents granted in the United States are from foreign nations, even though the United States was the first country to adopt strict emissions standards.
There is a large body of literature on technological diffusion across countries (surveyed by Keller [2004] ) but little work focusing specifically on environmental technologies. In general, there are two potential avenues through which foreign knowledge generally can have an influence in the domestic economy. First, as noted in our discussion of R&D spillovers, foreign knowledge may affect the productivity of domestic R&D. The "blueprints" represented by foreign patents may serve to inspire additional innovation by domestic inventors. Such productivity increases are knowledge spillovers, as the knowledge represented by the foreign patent creates a positive externality-knowledge from abroad that is borrowed by the domestic inventor (Griliches 1979) . Second, new technologies owned by foreigners simply may be diffuse and adopted directly by domestic firms. Buonanno, Carraro, and Galeotti (2003) provide perhaps the only example of foreignknowledge spillovers in a simulation model, with a somewhat ad hoc calibration of spillover parameters to match R&D-output ratios. More generally, knowledge spillovers, and especially international technology transfer (after a technology is available for export), have not been modeled directly in simulations of climate policy. Given these two avenues for knowledge to enter the economy, representing foreign-knowledge influences is an important area for development in integrated assessment models. At the same time, empirical research on the extent to which foreign knowledge influences domestic inventors will be necessary to calibrate these models, as little of the work on foreign-knowledge spillovers is at the level of aggregation necessary to calibrate such a model.
There also may be need to consider the interaction of international diffusion and domestic R&D. Lanjouw and Mody (1996) and Popp (2006c) , for example, find evidence of innovation in countries that adopt regulations late, suggesting that these countries do not always take advantage of technologies "off the shelf" that have been developed elsewhere. Instead, adaptive R&D seems to be necessary to suit the technology to the local market, as these later patents are more likely to cite earlier foreign, rather than domestic, inventions. The need for adaptive R&D suggests that either: a) diffusion across countries will be slower than within countries, as an additional research step is needed to fit the technology to local conditions; or b) that foreign knowledge adopted directly (i.e., without adaptive R&D) will be an "imperfect fit" for local conditions and thus will be less effective than in the technology's initial market.
Conclusion
Technological change is at once the most important and least understood feature driving the future cost of climate-change mitigation. Quantitative research has tended to follow two distinct and often isolated paths: empirical, microeconomic work on the nature of R&D and technological progress and simulation modeling of macroeconomic models with some technology detail and assumptions about how productivity and technology cost respond to various activities. While these simulation models often are used to provide quantitative guidance to policy debates, a review of recent work suggests that efforts to endogenize technological change often fail to calibrate themselves to important empirical benchmarks, at worst, and fail to clearly communicate their assumptions, at best. Meanwhile, microeconomic research often fails to focus on important questions asked by the simulation modelers.
What might a coherent research agenda look like, based on a review of both research areas? First, simulation models should communicate more clearly what benchmarks are being matched in terms of baseline productivity growth and energy-price elasticities, as well as the gross and net returns to energy R&D (both incremental and discrete increases from the baseline).
To the extent that models involve multi-sector, or multi-region, R&D, assumptions about spillovers should be explained. When models include both R&D and LBD, efforts to avoid double counting the potential for R&D or experience to lower costs should be explained.
Second, microeconomic work should attempt to provide more information about spillovers across industries and regions. A high priority should be efforts to disentangle R&D and learning-by-doing effects to avoid the double counting just noted. Finally, given the prevalence of government R&D proposals, it would be valuable to explore the relative contribution of public versus private R&D. Simulation work also might usefully explore how both types of R&D could be usefully employed in a model. 
